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	SUPERIOR COURT OF	THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
11	COUNTY O	F SANTA CLARA
12		
13	RAKLY DOMINGUEZ and GRACE	Case No.: 21CV381890
14	DOMINGUEZ , individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
15	Plaintiffs,	AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
16	vs.	ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS, AND
17		SERVICE AWARDS FOR CLASS REPRESENTATIVES
18	ALL-PRO BAIL BONDS, INC., a California Corporation, BANKERS INSURANCE	Date: September 20, 2023
19	COMPANY, A Florida Corporation, and	Time: 1:30 p.m.
20	BANKERS SURETY SERVICES, INC. , a Florida Corporation,	Judge: Hon. Theodore C. Zayner Dept.: 19
21		
22	Defendants.	
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1		TABLE OF CONTENTS		
2	I.	INTRODUCTION		
3	II.	THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES ARE REASONABLE		
5		A. The Overwhelmingly Positive Reaction of the Class and Excellent Result Obtained by the Settlement Support Approval of the Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs		
67		B. The Requested Attorneys' Fees Are Reasonable Under the Percentage of the Fund and Lodestar-Multiplier Analyses		
8		(1) The Requested Fees Are Reasonable As a Percentage of the Fund		
9		(2) The Fees Request Is Reasonable Under the Lodestar-Multiplier Method		
10	III.	THE REQUESTED COSTS ARE REASONABLE10		
11	IV.	THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE'S SERVICE AWARD IS REASONABLE1		
12	V.	CONCLUSION		
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28		·		

1	TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
2	
3	CASES
4	Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980)3
5 6	Chavez v. Netflix, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 4th 43 (2008)
7	Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta, 97 Cal. App. 4th 740 (2007)7
8 9	Clark v. American Residential Services, LLC, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785 (2009)11
10	Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, 188 Cal. App 4th 603 (2010)8
11 12	Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 34 Cal. 4 th 553 (2004)9
13	Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)2, 7
1415	Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy, 215 Cal. App [.] 4th 972 (2013)7
	In re Consumer Privacy Cases, 175 Cal. App. 4th 545 (2009)5
17 18	Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122 (2001)
	Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, 1 Cal. 5th 480 (2016)
20 21	Matter of Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 962 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1992)
22	Ridgeway v Walmart Stores Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 975 (N.D. Cal. 2017)10
2324	Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of Cal., Inc., 144 Cal. App 4th 785 (2006)
25	Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25 (1977)
2627	Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP, 222 Cal. App. 4 th 1228 (2014)
28	::

1	Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, 92 Cal. App 4th 819 (2001)
2 3	Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2002)8
4	Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 91 Cal App. 4 th 224 (2001)8
5	
6	Woodland Hills Residents Assn. v. City Council, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 933 (1979)6
7	DOCKETED CASES
8	DOCKETED CASES
9	Burleigh v. National University, Case No. MSC21-00939 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Contra Costa Cnty., Aug. 26, 2022)
10	Carr et al. v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc., Case No. 21CV001245 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty, June 27, 2023)
12	Cassidy v. Keyence Corporation of America, Case No. 21CV382350 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Santa Clara Cnty., February 8, 2023)
13	Castillo v. Holy Names University, Case No. HG21097245 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty., May 2, 2023)
14 15	Glor v. iHeart Media + Entertainment, Case No. 22CV005286 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty., February 14, 2023)
16 17	Harrold v. California Family Health LLC, Case No. 34-2022-00323409 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sacramento Cnty., August 17, 2023)5, 7
18	Merlan v. Alliant International University, Case No. 37-2019-00064053-CU- OE-CTL (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Diego Cnty., November 2, 2021)
19	
20	Rodriguez v River City Bank, Case No. 1-13-cv-257676 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sacramento Cnty., October 26, 2022)
21	TREATISES
22	
23	Newberg on Class Actions § 15.73 (5th ed.)
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	iii

I. INTRODUCTION

In conjunction with their motion for final approval, Plaintiffs move this Court for (a) an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of \$766,590, representing 33.33% of the \$2.3 million Gross Settlement Amount ("GSA") and only 3.2% of the total settlement value including the \$21.5 million in injunctive relief secured as a result of this Settlement; (b) reimbursement of out-of-pocket litigation expenses in the amount of \$12,375.56 (which is \$7,624.44 less than the \$20,000 noticed to the Class); and (c) service awards for the Class Representatives in the amount of \$5,000 to Plaintiff Rakly Dominguez and \$2,500 to Plaintiff Grace Dominguez. The Class Notice provided the Class with notice of the requested fees, costs, and service awards. *Not one* of the 33,798 Class Members objected to the Settlement, including to the requested fees, costs, and service awards.

Class Counsel believe this request is appropriate because of the excellent result achieved for the Class, and the risk and financial burden Class Counsel undertook to litigate this novel and complex case for the Class. The Settlement provides robust monetary payments to Class Members with an average payment per CM of \$41.82, and a high payment of \$943.66. Declaration of Bryn Bridley Regarding Notice and Settlement Administration ("Bridley Decl."), filed herewith, at ¶ 11. These are excellent results considering All Pro's many potential defenses on the merits and on class certification, and the risk that Plaintiffs would be unable to establish any liability of the Bankers Entities, and, if able to secure a judgment against only All-Pro, would be unable to collect all of that judgment. Declaration of Julian Hammond In Support of Motion for Final Approval and Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Service Awards ("Hammond Final Decl."), filed herewith, ¶¶ 8-10.

The requested attorneys' fees are reasonable and fair because they represent the routinely approved 1/3 of the Gross Settlement Amount under the common fund approach. The fees request is only 3.2% of the total settlement value including injunctive relief secured as a result of this Settlement. Under a lodestar-multiplier cross-check, the requested fees represent a multiplier of only 2.35 to Class Counsel's lodestar to date—a multiplier that will decrease as Class Counsel continue to fulfill their post-settlement obligations, including ensuring that the Settlement is distributed to the Class and reporter to the Court at final accounting.

The requested service awards, which this Court already approved preliminarily, warrant final approval because they are similar to awards approved by courts as reasonable and are commensurate with the risks taken by Plaintiffs, without whose efforts the Class Members would not receive any payments.

Accordingly, the Court should approve the requested amounts in full.

II. THE REQUESTED ATTORNEYS' FEES ARE REASONABLE

A. <u>The Overwhelmingly Positive Reaction of the Class and Excellent Result Obtained by the Settlement Support Approval of the Requested Attorneys' Fees and Costs</u>

The positive reaction of the Class supports the requested fee award. The Court-approved Notice informed Class Members of the requested attorneys' fees, costs, and service awards. To date, of the 33,798 Class Members, no Class Members has objected and only 6 have opted out. Bridley Decl. ¶ 9.

This overwhelmingly positive reaction is consistent with the substantial benefit achieved for the Class. Class Members will receive an average payment of \$41.82, and a highest payment of \$943.66. Bridley Decl. ¶ 11. The Settlement is non-reversionary and every Class Member who did not opt out will automatically receive a payment. In addition to the substantial monetary payments, the Settlement Agreement includes a stipulated permanent injunction enjoining All-Pro, and persons or entities acting in concert with All-Pro, from collecting any outstanding installment premium payments from all non-spouse co-signers remaining due and owing on All-Pro Agreements executed prior to May 1, 2021. Plaintiffs estimate the value of this relief to the Class Members within the Class Period at \$21.5 million. Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 5 & fn 2.

B. The Requested Attorneys' Fees Are Reasonable Under the Percentage of the Fund and Lodestar-Multiplier Analyses

The award of attorneys' fees in common fund wage and hour class action settlements should start with the percentage method. See Laffitte v. Robert Half Int'l, 1 Cal. 5th 480, 503 (2016) ("We join the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts in holding that when class action litigation establishes a monetary fund for the benefit of the class members, and the trial court in its equitable powers awards class counsel a fee out of that fund, the court may determine the amount of a reasonable fee by choosing an appropriate percentage of the fund created."). The Supreme Court has also affirmed the lodestarmultiplier method for determining the fees award. See id. at 490 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983)). Here, the attorneys' fees requested are reasonable under both approaches.

(1) The Requested Fees Are Reasonable As a Percentage of the Fund

a) Plaintiffs Have Created a Substantial Common Fund

Courts in California have long recognized the equitable "common fund" doctrine under which attorneys who create a common fund or benefit for a group of persons may be awarded their fees and costs out of that fund. "[W]hen a number of persons are entitled in common to a specific fund, and an action brought by a plaintiff or plaintiffs for the benefit of all results in the creation or preservation of that fund, such plaintiff or plaintiffs may be awarded attorney's fees out of the fund." *Serrano v. Priest*,

20 Cal. 3d 25, 34 (1977); see also Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) ("[A] lawyer who recovers a common fund . . . is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fee from the fund as a whole").

Here, there is an easily calculable \$2.3 million common fund that will provide substantial benefits to the class. *See Serrano*, 20 Cal. 3d at 35 (common fund approach is available when Class Counsel's efforts "have resulted in the preservation or recovery of a certain or easily calculable sum of money - out of which sum or 'fund' the fees are to be paid.").

b) Fee Awards of One-Third of the Common Fund Are Routinely Awarded

The requested fees represent one-third of the Gross Settlement Amount—a percentage routinely awarded in common fund settlements. *See e.g.*, *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 489 (affirming a fee award of 33% of the settlement); *Chavez v. Netflix, Inc.*, 162 Cal. App. 4th 43, 66, n.11 (2008) ("[e]mpirical studies show that, regardless of whether the percentage method or the lodestar method is used, fee awards in class actions average around one-third of recovery."); Newberg on Class Actions § 15.73 (5th ed.) ("[F]ee awards in class actions average around one-third of the recovery."). This percentage is in line with (or lower than) the contingency fee that Class Counsel and the class members would likely have agreed to if such an agreement had been possible. Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 12; *see*, *e.g.*, *Matter of Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig.*, 962 F.2d 566, 572 (7th Cir. 1992) (in a common fund case, the object "is to give the lawyer what he would have gotten in the way of a fee in an arm's length negotiation, had one been feasible").

c) The Requested Fees Are Fair and Reasonable

The requested fees constitute a reasonable charge to the Class in light of (1) the excellent results achieved for the Class; (2) the risk of litigation including the complexity and novelty of the case; (3) preclusion of other income-generating work; (4) similar contingent fee arrangements in private litigation; and (5) awards made in similar cases.

i. Plaintiffs Obtained Excellent Results

The average payment per Class Member is \$41.82 and the highest payment is \$943.66. Bridely Decl. ¶ 11. The Gross Settlement represents a recovery of 41% of Defendants' maximum exposure and 78% of Defendants' realistic exposure (including the \$2.3 million Gross Settlement and \$21.5 million in injunctive relief provided for in the Settlement Agreement). Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 56. This an excellent result in light of the risks presented by Defendants' defenses and the inherent uncertainties of continued litigation.

ii. Risk of Litigation and Novelty and Complexity of the Case

Plaintiffs' Counsel have been litigating this case for over two years, and expended at least 427 attorney hours and over \$12,000 in out-of-pocket expenses to date, all as-yet-uncompensated, and

without any certainty of receiving payment. Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 52. If the Parties continued to litigate this case, the trial court would rule on a number of issues including (a) whether the exclusive remedy for a violation of Civil Code § 1799.91 is provided in § 1799.95, meaning that there is no basis for Plaintiffs and Class Members to seek restitution for payments already made on their All-Pro agreements, unless All-Pro collected money from them as a result of legal action; (b) whether the initial payments or down payments made by CMs are part of any consumer credit contract entered into by Class Members because they were not amounts agreed to be paid on "a deferred payment basis" as defined under § 1799.90(a); and (c) whether All-Pro could receive an offset against any benefit received by Class Members under the bail bonds contract. Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 8. Regardless of the outcome at trial, the losing party would likely appeal, given that some of these issues have not been conclusively addressed by an appellate court.

As to class certification, All Pro could have argued that in many instances it is impossible to determine whether payments on the All Pro agreements were made by Class Members or by other individuals, and a court might determine that individual issues regarding the fact and extent of the harm actually suffered by specific Class Members would predominate and a class should not be certified. *Id.* ¶ 9.

Finally, even if Plaintiffs obtained a judgment, the risk posed by recent legislative and policy developments in California significantly reduced All-Pro's revenues over the past two years, and proposed legislation and trends in bail practice would potentially further reduce All-Pro's revenues over the next several years, which raised the possibility that Plaintiffs would be unable to collect any significant amount. *Id.* ¶ 8.d.

There was also the risk posed by the Bankers Defendants' contentions that Bankers Insurance Company, as a surety on bail bonds issued by All-Pro, and Bankers Surety Services, Inc., as an internal general agency for Bankers Insurance Company, do not control or participate in any way in any extension of credit for any remaining premium due to All-Pro from those who purchase bail bonds from All-Pro, and are not liable for any failure by All-Pro to provide any required notice under California Civil Code § 1799.91 to non-spousal co-signers. *Id.* ¶ 10.

These contentions posed a very real risk that Plaintiffs would be unable to litigate their class claims at all and put Class Members at a risk of recovering nothing.

iii. Preclusion of Other Income-Generating Work

Taking this case diverted Class Counsel's time from other other fee-generating work. *See Serrano*, 20 Cal. 3d at 49 (one of the factors that weighs in favor of granting request for attorneys' fees

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is "the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys"). Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 57.

iv. Percentage Requested Is Consistent with the Private Marketplace

The requested fees are in line with (or less than) the fee that Class Counsel would have expected if they had negotiated individual retainer agreements with each Class Member. Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 10. Such an award ensures that Class Counsel receive an appropriate fee for the benefit conferred on the Class, particularly when it would be impossible *ex ante* to enter a fair fee arrangement with all the members of the Class.

v. Awards in Similar Cases

Class Counsel has been awarded 1/3 or more of the common fund in numerous other class action settlements, including Harrold v. California Family Health LLC, Case No. 34-2022-00323409 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sacramento Cnty., August 17, 2023) (approving fees of 35% of \$223,000 representative action settlement); Carr et al. v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc., Case No. 21CV001245 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty, June 27, 2023) (approving fees of 1/3 of \$1,247,907.53 class settlement); Castillo v. Holy Names University, Case No. HG21097245 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty., May 2, 2023) (approving fees of 1/3 of \$907,701 class settlement); Glor v. iHeart Media + Entertainment, Case No. 22CV005286 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty., February 14, 2023) (approving fees of 1/3 of \$1,1220,000 class settlement); Cassidy v. Keyence Corporation of America, Case No. 21CV382350 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Santa Clara Cnty., February 8, 2023) (approving fees of 1/3 of \$300,000 settlement); Rodriguez v River City Bank, Case No. 1-13-cv-257676 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sacramento Cnty., October 26, 2022) (approving fees of 35% of \$140,000 class settlement); Burleigh v. National University, Case No. MSC21-00939 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Contra Costa Cnty., Aug. 26, 2022) (approving fees of 40% of \$925,000 class settlement); Merlan v. Alliant International University, Case No. 37-2019-00064053-CU- OE-CTL (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Diego Cnty., November 2, 2021) (approving fees of 1/3 of a \$711,500 wage and hour class action as "not out of line with class action fee awards calculated using the percentage-of-the-benefit method"); and many other cases listed at Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 6.

(2) The Fees Request Is Reasonable Under the Lodestar-Multiplier Method

California's lodestar-multiplier method is a two-step process of fee calculation under which the Court first determines a lodestar value of the fees by multiplying the time reasonably spent on the case by a reasonable hourly rate. *In re Consumer Privacy Cases*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 545, 556-57 (2009). The Court may then enhance the lodestar by applying a multiplier to take into account the contingent nature and risk associated with the action, the degree of skill required, and the ultimate success achieved, as

well as other factors. *See Ketchum v. Moses*, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001) (also explaining that the "purpose of a fee enhancement, or so-called multiplier, for contingent risk is to bring the financial incentives for attorneys enforcing important . . . rights"); *Laffitte*, 1 Cal. 5th at 504 (in wage and hour class action, trial court properly considered novelty, difficulty, and skill displayed in determining 2.03-2.13 multiplier reasonable as cross-check to 33% fee).

The goal is "to encourage suits effectuating a strong [public] policy by awarding substantial attorney's fees . . . to those who successfully bring such suits." *Woodland Hills Residents Assn. v. City Council*, 23 Cal. 3d 917, 933 (1979). "Adequate fee awards are perhaps the most effective means of achieving [the] salutary goal [of encouraging 'private attorney general' actions, and] [c]ourts should not be indifferent to the realities of the legal marketplace or unduly parsimonious in the calculation of such fees." *Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 92 Cal. App 4th 819, 839 (2001)

Here, Plaintiffs' Counsel's lodestar-based fees are reasonable. Plaintiffs seek compensation for 427 hours expended by their attorneys whose rates range from \$650 to \$925 per hour. Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 45. A detailed breakdown of counsel's lodestar is submitted herewith. *Id.* ¶¶ 13-26. The combined lodestar is \$326,517 and the requested fee award thus amounts to a 2.35 multiplier. *Id.* ¶ 49. The lodestar will increase, and the multiplier will be reduced, as Counsel spend additional time filing the instant motion, preparing for and appearing at the final approval hearing, and supervising the distribution of the settlement funds if final approval is granted. *Id.* A multiplier is appropriate given Class Counsel's success in achieving an excellent result for the Class, for taking on a contingent risk to do so, for the novelty and complexity of this case, and other factors discussed above.

a) Hours Spent by Plaintiffs' Counsel Were Reasonable

The hours spent by Plaintiffs' Counsel were "reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation." *Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of Cal., Inc.*, 144 Cal. App 4th 785, 818 (2006). Plaintiffs' Counsel's time was spent on: the investigation of Defendants' organizational and operational structures, the relationship between Defendants, the nature of bail bond premium financing agreements offered by Defendants, and the notices provided to Class Members regarding All-Pro's bail bond premium financing agreements; discussions and interviews between Plaintiffs' Counsel, Plaintiffs, and other Class Members about bail bonds they arranged and bail bond premium financing agreements they entered into with All-Pro; drafting, researching, reviewing and discussing the Complaint; reviewing and analyzing key data and documents produced by Defendants; drafting a detailed mediation brief with a legal and factual analysis of Plaintiffs' claims and a detailed damages model based on an analysis of the class data; reviewing Defendant's mediation brief; attending the mediation; negotiating the settlement;

obtaining approval of the Settlement; and overseeing the administration of Notice to the Class. Hammond Final Decl. ¶¶ 15-26.

Plaintiffs' Counsel made every effort to staff and litigate this case efficiently by minimizing duplication of work and assigning tasks in a cost-efficient manner based on the timekeepers' experience levels and talents. Hammond Final Decl. ¶¶ 42-44. Plaintiffs' Counsel exercised billing judgment to delete or reduce certain time entries based on Counsel's experience in other complex cases, and knowledge of the tasks assigned to attorneys in this case. *Id.* Finally, Plaintiffs' Counsel avoided the need for extensive litigation by successfully settling this case less than a year after filing the lawsuit.

b) <u>Plaintiffs' Counsel's Hourly Rates Are Reasonable</u>

Plaintiffs' Counsel's requested hourly rates are shown in the table immediately below:

Attorney/Timekeeper	Year Admitted	Rate
Julian Hammond, Principal	2000	\$925
Arie Michelsohn, Counsel	1999	\$750
Adrian Barnes, Senior Counsel	2007	\$775
Polina Brandler, Counsel	2010	\$750
Ari Cherniak, Associate	2011	\$650

The rates claimed are reasonable if they are "within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work." *Children's Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v. Bonta*, 97 Cal. App. 4th 740, 783 (2007). Courts consider the "prevailing market rates in the relevant community," as well as the "experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees." *Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy*, 215 Cal. App. 4th 972, 1009 (2013). In complex litigation like class action employment cases, the appropriate market is that governing rates for attorneys engaged in "equally complex" matters. *Hensley*, 461 U.S. at 430, n.4.

The requested hourly rates are reasonable under these standards. Plaintiffs' Counsel request compensation at rates that are comparable to the prevailing market rates for attorneys of similar experience, qualification, and skill. HammondLaw's current hourly rates were approved in *Harrold v California Family Health LLC*, Case No. 34-2022-00323409 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sacramento Cnty., August 17, 2023); *Harris v Southern New Hampshire University*, Case No. RG21109745 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty., May 12, 2023), *Castillo v. Holy Names University*, Case No. HG21097245 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty., May 2, 2023); and *Carr et al. v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc.*, Case No. 21CV001245 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty., June 27, 2023) (awarding 2.1 multiplier calculated using

my firm's 2023 rates); and its slightly lower 2022 hourly rates were approved in *Glor v. iHeart Media* + *Entertainment*, Case No. 22CV005286 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty., February 14, 2023); *Cassidy v Keyence Corporation of America*, Case No. 21CV382350 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Santa Clara Cnty., February 8, 2023); *Rodriguez v. River City Bank*, Case No. 1-13-cv-257676 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sacramento Cnty., October 26, 2022); *Burleigh v. National University*, Case No. MSC21-00939 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Contra Costa Cnty., August 26, 2022); *Parsons v. La Sierra University*, Case No. CVRI2000104 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Riverside Cnty., May 19, 2022); *Sweetland-Gil v. University of the Pacific*, Case No. STK-CV-UOE-2019-0014682 (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Joaquin Cnty., March 4, 2022); and *Senese v. University of San Diego*, Case No. 37-2019-00047124-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Diego Cnty., February 8, 2022). Hammond Final Decl. ¶¶ 45-46.

c) A Multiplier Is Appropriate

"After making the lodestar calculation, the court may augment or diminish that amount based on a number of factors specific to the case, including the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the attorneys' skill in presenting the issues, the extent to which the case precluded the attorneys from accepting other work, and the contingent nature of the work." *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino*, 188 Cal. App 4th 603, 616 (2010). The fees request, here, represents a multiplier of 2.35 to Class Counsel's current lodestar of \$326,517, although that multiplier will be reduced by the conclusion of the case. Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 49. A multiplier is well supported for cases like this one, in which Counsel accepted the contingent risk of the litigation and obtained an excellent result. *Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc.*, 91 Cal App. 4th 224, 255 (2001) (lodestar "multipliers can range from 2 to 4 or even higher"); *Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp.*, 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 & n.6 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming lodestar multiplier of 3.65 and surveying 34 class common fund settlements to find that 83% of multipliers were in the 1 to 4 range).

Class Counsel has been awarded similar or higher multipliers in other class action settlements including by Judge Patricia Lucas in *Peng v. The President and Board of Trustees of Santa Clara College*, Case No. 19CV348190 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Santa Clara Cnty., April 21, 2021) (awarding 2.75 multiplier); and other California Superior Courts in *Carr et al v Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc.*, Case No. 21CV001245 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty., June 27, 2023) (awarding 2.1 multiplier); *Glor v. iHeart Media + Entm't, Inc.*, Case No. 22CV005286 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty., February 14, 2023) (finding the fees request justified under the lodestar/multiplier analysis and awarding 2.12 multiplier); *Burleigh v. Brandman University*, Case No. 30-2020-01172801-CU-OE-CXC (Cal. Sup. Ct. Orange Cnty., January 27, 2023) (awarding 2.1 multiplier); *Sweetland-Gil v. University of the*

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Cnty., March 17, 2021) (awarding 3.05 multiplier); and *Stempien v. DeVry University, Inc.*, No. RG19002623 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda Cnty., June 30, 2020) (awarding a 2.46 multiplier). Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 49.

The applicable factors strongly support the requested multiplier, including (1) the contingency risk Class Counsel assumed in accepting the representation; (2) the novel and complex nature of the case; and (3) the exceptional result achieved.

Pacific, Case No. STK-CV-UOE-2019-0014682 (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Joaquin Cnty., March 4, 2022)

(awarding 2.52 multiplier); Senese v. University of San Diego, Case No. 37-2019-00047124-CU-OE-

CTL (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Diego Cnty., February 8, 2022) (awarding 2.98 multiplier); Stupar et al. v.

University of La Verne, Case No. 19STCV333363 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Los Angeles Cnty., October 14, 2021)

(awarding 2.48 multiplier); Normand v. Loyola Marymount University, Case No. 19STCV17953 (Cal.

Sup. Ct. Los Angeles Cnty., September 9, 2021) (awarding 3.53 multiplier so that "counsel should not

be disadvantaged for efficient litigation tactics and that lowering the percentage-of-gross fee award could

encourage inefficient ligation"); Mooiman et al. v. Saint Mary's College of California, Case No. C19-

02092 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Contra Costa Cnty., June 10, 2021) (awarding 2.0 multiplier); Morse v Fresno

Pacific University, Case No. 19-CV-04350 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Merced Cnty., April 6, 2021) (awarding a 3.13

multiplier); Harris-Foster v. University of Phoenix, Case No. RG19019028 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Alameda

i. Contingency Risk

An application of a multiplier is appropriate to compensate Plaintiffs' Counsel for the significant contingency risk assumed by taking on this litigation. *Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.*, 34 Cal. 4th 553, 580 (2004) ("[A] lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions."); *Ketchum*, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132 ("[A] contingent fee contract, since it involves a gamble on the result, may properly provide for a larger compensation than would otherwise be reasonable.").

As stated above, Plaintiffs' Counsel have expended over 427 hours, all as-yet uncompensated, and have expended over \$12,000 in out-of-pocket expenses, without any certainty of receiving payment. Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 52. There was a significant risk that Plaintiffs' Counsel would be paid nothing in view of All Pro's potential defenses to class certification and the merits discussed above; the Bankers Defendants' contentions that they are not liable for All-Pro's alleged failure to provide required notice under California Civil Code § 1799.91 to non-spousal co-signers; and the possibility that Plaintiffs would be unable to collect any significant judgment from All-Pro. *Id.* ¶¶ 8-10; *See, e.g., Taylor v. Nabors Drilling USA, LP*, 222 Cal. App. 4th 1228, 1252 (2014) (continency risk and deferral in payment alone

supported multiplier of 1.4 to 1.5); *Ridgeway v Walmarrt Stores Inc.*, 269 F. Supp. 3d 975, 996-97 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (contingency risk was among factors supporting 2.0 multiplier).

Indeed, declining to approve percentage-of-the-fund awards that are multiples of the lodestar would have the perverse effect of penalizing counsel for efficiency and could create incentives for counsel to perform unnecessary work or engage in avoidable litigation rather than resolving cases quickly. Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 54; see Normand v. Loyola Marymount University, Case No. 19STCV17953 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Los Angeles Cnty., September 9, 2021) (awarding Class Counsel a 3.53 multiplier because "counsel should not be disadvantaged for efficient litigation tactics and that lowering the percentage-of-gross fee award could encourage inefficient ligation"). Here, Class Counsel obtained this result for the Class quickly, in large part due to Class Counsel's experiences in complex litigation and skill in targeting the data and other information needed to assess the reasonable settlement value of the case. Id. ¶ 5.

ii. Novelty and Complexity of the Case

This case presented complex issues, including novel issues not yet conclusively decided by an appellate court, as well as issues regarding class certification. In the absence of settlement, Plaintiffs would have to engage in motion practice, starting with opposing Defendants' expected respective demurrers, complete formal discovery, and file a class certification motion. Plaintiffs would then have to spend dozens of hours preparing for trial. Assuming Plaintiffs won, Defendants would likely appeal. The uncertainties of continued litigation presented a very real risk that Plaintiffs would be unable to recovering anything for the class. Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 55. Despite these risks, Class Counsel resolved the matter on very favorable terms to the Class.

iii. Excellent Result Achieved

The results achieved for the Class are excellent, representing 41% of Defendants' maximum exposure, and 78% of Defendants' realistic exposure (including the \$2.3 million Gross Settlement and \$21.5 million in injunctive relief provided for in the Settlement Agreement). Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 56. The average payment per CM is \$41.83, with a high payment of \$943.66. *Id.*; Bridley Decl. ¶ 11. The significant and immediate relief provided by this Settlement justifies final approval, especially in light of the risks presented by Defendants' potential and actual defenses and the inherent uncertainties of continued litigation.

III. THE REQUESTED COSTS ARE REASONABLE.

Class Counsel has incurred \$12,375.56 in litigation costs, which is \$7,624.44 less than the \$20,000 for costs stated in the Court-approved Class Notice. Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 68. Class Counsel's

litigation costs include filing and serving costs, research costs, witness location costs, technology costs, and mediation costs. *Id.* ¶¶ 58-66. Thus, Class Counsel's requested litigation costs are reasonable and should be approved.

IV. THE CLASS REPRESENTATIVE'S SERVICE AWARD IS REASONABLE

In its Preliminary Approval Order, ¶ III.C, the Court found that "the service awards are warranted and they are approved in the amount of \$5,000 for Rakly Dominguez and \$2,500 for Grace Dominguez." The requested service awards, which are smaller than the service awards originally sought by Plaintiffs, should be finally approved based on all relevant factors courts use in determining service awards including (1) the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class; (2) the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions; (3) the amount of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation; and (4) the risk the plaintiff assumed. *Clark v. American Residential Services, LLC*, 175 Cal. App. 4th 785, 804 (2009). All of the above factors support the service awards here.

First, Plaintiffs served the Class well. They collected and provided documents and diligently assisted Class Counsel in the investigation for the case. Decl. of Rakly Dominguez In Support of Mot. for Prelim. App., filed January 9, 2023, ¶ 4 ("Rakly Decl."); Decl. of Grace Dominguez In Support of Mot. for Prelim. App., filed January 9, 2023, ¶ 4 ("Grace Decl."). Plaintiffs' participation and assistance were critical to the success of this litigation and the enforcement of consumer protections. Without Plaintiffs' commitment to come forward and serve as Class Representatives in commencing this lawsuit, this litigation would not have been brought.

Second, this litigation resulted in substantial monetary and injunctive relief to the Class which Class Members will receive automatically without the need to file a claim. Further, when negotiating the allocation of the Net Settlement to Class Members, Plaintiffs agreed to a payment structure that was the fairest and best practicable option for the Class although it ensured they would receive a smaller recovery on their All Pro bail bond payments. *See* Supplemental Declaration of Julian Hammond, filed March 13, 2023, ¶ 9; Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 71.

Third, the service award is appropriate to compensate Plaintiffs for the time and effort expended in this litigation. Plaintiff Rakly Dominguez estimates spending at least 35 hours working on this case; and Plaintiff Grace Dominguez has spent at least 15 hours working on this case. Rakly Decl. ¶ 11; Grace Decl. ¶ 11.

Fourth, by agreeing to formally represent the Class, Plaintiffs are now publicly associated with this lawsuit. Plaintiffs are reserved people who value their privacy and by participating in this case they

1	have made public what had been a private matter of securing a bail bond . Rakly Decl. ¶ 12; Grace Decl		
2	¶ 12; Hammond Final Decl. ¶ 72.		
3	Finally, Plaintiffs are both entering into a general release of all claims against Defendants – a far		
4	broader release than other Class Members are giving. SA ¶ 2.18.		
5	Accordingly, the Court should approve the requested Service Awards in full.		
	V. CONCLUSION		
6	Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court award attorneys' fees in the amount of \$766,590;		
7	litigation costs in the amount of \$12,375.56, and service awards of \$5,000 and \$2,500 to Plaintiffs Rakly		
8	and Grace Dominguez, respectively.		
9	DATED: August 28, 2023 Respectfully submitted,		
10	respectant susmitted,		
11	s/ Julian Hammond		
12	Julian Hammond Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Putative Class		
13	Attorneys for Flaminis and the Futative Class		
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